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Abstract
For a few decades, a growing literature has examined the role of water resources
in interstate conﬂicts. In line with this literature, this study analyzes the risk of a
conﬂict between countries sharing freshwater. While some scholars claim that water-
based conﬂicts can never occur, this analysis determines this risk by linking it to
the size of a negotiation interval; the probability-to-conﬂict decreasing with this size.
In fact, we are going to show that the size of this interval diminishes with scarcer
resources and with the degree of the heterogeneity of countries measured by their
productive eﬃciency. Then, in a peace scenario, we determine by bargaining the
optimal allocation and we study its variation according to the parameters of the
model. These theoretical results will be conﬁrmed by an econometric approach.
Keywords: Conﬂict Theory, Water-based Conﬂict, Nash-Bargaining, Dyadic Analy-
sis
Introduction
For a few decades, a growing literature has examined the role of water resources
in interstate conﬂicts. In line with this literature, this study analyzes the risk of a
conﬂict between countries sharing freshwater. While some scholars claim that water-
based conﬂicts can never occur, this analysis determines this risk by linking it to
the size of a negotiation interval; the probability-to-conﬂict decreasing with this size.
In fact, we are going to show that the size of this interval diminishes with scarcer
resources and with the degree of the heterogeneity of countries measured by their
productive eﬃciency. Then, in a peace scenario, we determine by bargaining the
optimal allocation and we study its variation according to the parameters of the
model. These theoretical results will be conﬁrmed by an econometric approach.
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In fact, this question is embedded in a wider relationship between resource
scarcity and conﬂict that can be traced back to early 1970. In a nutshell, dur-
ing the 1970s and the 1980s, resource-based security revolved around three issues,
namely Middle Eastern oil, Soviet natural gas and Southern African minerals. Ac-
cording to Choucri and North [8], internal demand push states toward expansion,
increasing the propensity for conﬂicts. The Gulf wars witness that the West always
tries to safeguard access to oil and the recent (2005-06) Russia-Ukraine gas disputes
illustrate that tensions are not ﬁnished. Today, water scarcity fans tensions and is
expected to be a source of possible future conﬂict due to the increasing stress on the
resource.
As a consequence, a large literature on water-based conﬂicts was developed op-
posing the Neomalthusians to the Cornucopians. The former predicts that conﬂicts
over scarce resource are likely to become more prevalent (Bächler [3], Homer-Dixon
[23], Klare [25]), especially in poorer regions more dependent on land and agriculture.
More speciﬁcally, Miguel and al. [28] ﬁnd a strong negative eﬀect of economic growth
on the likelihood of outbreak of civil war among 41 African countries, using rainfall
variation as an exogenous instrument. Water is an essential resource for human life
as well as for agriculture and industry and, consequently, stresses the attention of a
substantial literature describing water both as an historic and, by extrapolation, as
a future cause of interstate warfare. For instance, Furlong and al. [13] claim that if
one of the riparian nations within a basin is water-short then there is a greater risk
of interstate conﬂict. Besides, Gleick [16] proposes a classiﬁcation to outline the role
of water in diﬀerent conﬂicts.
On the other side, the Cornucopians are more optimistic, outlining the cooper-
ative aspects. Aaron Wolf [37] listed more than 3600 agreements along the history
and shows that the lone water-based conﬂict took place between the two Sumerian
city-states. According to him, international rivals sharing waters such as the Jordan
River, the Nile, the Ganges have generally favored cooperation over conﬂict. The
simple explanation is that water is simply too important to ﬁght over said Aaron
Wolf. Nations often go to the brink of war over water and then resolve their dif-
ferences. Indeed, some disagreements have been managed more peacefully such as
the Mexican-American dispute over pollution in Rio Grande and damming on the
Colorado River [20]. In fact, the majority of studies has actually focused on dispute
resolution. By the way, Carraro and al. [6] review the applications of non-cooperative
bargaining theory to water issues or other studies wonder how riparian states can
reach cooperative outcomes in conﬂicts over water sharing (Barret [4], Kilgour and
Dinar [26], Ambec and Sprumont [2], Dinar and Wolf [10]).
However, hydrological matters represent an additional dimension in many con-
ﬂicts. For instance, the Six-Day war is presented as the ﬁrst contemporary conﬂict
over water [27]. This event could stem from the Israeli decision to ﬁnish the aque-
duct to divert waters from the Tiberiade lake in 1957 which preceded a series of other
one-sided decisions which hardened the tensions in this area until the Six-Day war.
This claim is supported by recent empirical studies which highlight a strong positive
relationship between shared rivers and dyadic militarized conﬂict (Sowers [32], Toset,
Gleditsch and Hegre [34]). Moreover, the historical argument can be challenged be-
cause the absence of historical contests does not mean that any conﬂict will occur
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in the future. On the contrary, the ﬁercer competition due to a growing population
and an increasing water demand might lead to a malthusian backlash (Cooley [9],
Homer-Dixon [23], Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers [20]). By the way, Leif Ohlsson [30] says
that as long as more water in the hands of one country is perceived by another as
a loss of the same amount (. . . ) conﬂict and violent annexation of common water
resources is a viable strategy.
Despite these evidences, the attempts to tackle this topic within the economic
theory are quite few. To this end, this paper aims at contributing in the reduction
of this gap and to investigate how an interstate conﬂict can spark oﬀ. In fact,
the purpose of this study is three-fold. First, we investigate the issue of water-
related tensions through the conﬂict theory. At a theoretical level, as Garﬁnkel and
Skaperdas [14] claim, conﬂict is diﬃcult to comprehend from a traditional economic
perspective because of the existence of imperfectly enforced property rights which
represent a crucial motivation to engage in conﬂict and appropriate the resource of
the opponent. In our study, countries want to grab the resource for its productive-use.
The main contribution consists of outlining the existence of a negotiation interval by
comparing the well-being of each country in a peace scenario with their well-being
in a conﬂict scenario. The analysis of the variation of the size of this set will put
forth the role of water scarcity in a water-based conﬂict. In fact, this study follows
conﬂict models spearheaded largely by Hirshleifer ([21] and [22]) and Grossman ([17]
and [18]). Within this literature, Janmaat and Ruijs [24] analyze the same debate
by explicitly examining the role of leadership rather than the role of water scarcity.
They explore the diﬀerence between a simultaneous and sequential move game.
In a second step, we propose to analyze the Nash-bargaining solution in order
to exhibit the optimal cooperative solution when such an interval exists. Eﬀectively,
water-based conﬂicts may be a riddle insofar economic agents are likely to waste
resources in order to ﬁght over abundant resources such as territories or markets.
From this point of view, the suggestion of determining the optimal allocation on the
basis of the negotiation interval is interesting. Ansink and Weikard [1] also conduct a
Nash-bargaining analysis to shed light on the question under which conditions coun-
tries will jointly deﬁne property rights to contested water to promote international
water trade. However, their study is not based on this kind of negotiation set.
In a last step, we introduce consistent empirical investigations with our theoretical
results. The empirical analysis is based on a dyadic approach, the common way to
study countries' interactions.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts with some supporting facts.
The conﬂict model is introduced in section 3. Through comparative statics, we can
deﬁne a negotiation interval where countries may cooperate. This result motivates
the following section where we turn to a bargaining game. The optimal solution
depends on the quantity of water. Section 5 yields the empirical investigation to
test our theoretical approach. Finally, a brief discussion and concluding remarks are
oﬀered in section 6.
1 Cooperation versus Conﬂict
The debate between the defendants of cooperation and the defendants of conﬂict of-
ten sets forth the existence of the numerous agreements over water resources. Eﬀec-
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tively, the history of water dispute resolution, in contrast to that of conﬂict, is much
more impressive. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has
identiﬁed more than 3 600 treaties relating to international water resources, dating
between 805 and 1984. Moreover, several institutions and/or commissions have been
created for several years such as the Mekong Committee in 1957, the Indus Commis-
sion in 1960 or, more recently, the Nile Initiative Basin in 2001. All these facts and
ﬁgures witness that a treaty can have beforehand deﬁned water allocations between
riparian states. Nevertheless, this peaceful situation could be challenged for many
reasons.
First, the majority of these treaties deal with aspects of navigation and not
with consumptive-use. If we adopt the restriction proposed by Aaron Wolf, himself,
to treaties signed from 1870 and later that deal with water per se and excluding
those which deal only with boundaries or ﬁshing rights, it remains only 145 treaties
in the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database at the University of Alabama.
Most of them focus on hydropower and water-supplies, respectively 39% and 37%.
Nevertheless, a ﬁrst remark leads us to observe that there are less treaties than
the 260 existing river basins and, furthermore, there are several agreements for one
basin like for the Jordan basin where there were a succession of plans. Therefore,
cooperation is not the prerogative of all the river basins. Under the assumption of
Wolf claiming that such agreements guarantee a peaceful cooperation, there exist
some areas not protected by an agreement.
Secondly, turning to the existing water allocation treaties, there are for instance
the 1959 Nile Plan or the Johnston Plan for the Jordan River. The two following
tables describe these allocations.
Table 1: Plan for the Nil
basin, 1959
Thousand m3 Percent
Egypt 55 66
Sudan 18 21
Others 11 13
Total 84 100
Table 2: Johnston plan for the Jordan
River System, 19541
Thousand m3 Percent
Lebanon 35 (0) 2.75 (0)
Syria 132 (22) 10.25 (4.55)
Jordan 720 (100) 56 (20)
Israel 400 (375) 31 (75.45)
Total 1287 (497) 100 (100)
aIn brackets, speciﬁc allocation from the Jor-
dan river.
Then, in addition to the limited number of water-sharing treaties, these allocations can
be challenged because they were deﬁned accordingly an old self-interest theory giving the
utilization right to the downstream countries : the absolute integrity of the river, i.e. the
upstream riparian states can do nothing that aﬀects the ﬂow of the river.
In fact, there exist opposite doctrines which used to be employed to share transboundary
water in practice. To this end, in response to the absolute integrity principle, there is the
absolute territorial sovereignty which allocates the right to the most upstream nation. For
instance, Turkey hid behind it to justify its hydrological project.
Both sorts of property-rights regimes had been contested for a long time and remain
at the core of some interstate disputes. In eﬀect, the evolution towards new water division
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approaches come later. Today, the most important trend is the shift in principle adoption,
namely in position from rights-based criteria to needs-based criteria. On this basis, the
UN Watercourse Convention - signed in 1997 - consecrates the rule of equitable utilization
based on the international basin unit and, therefore, recognizes the obligation to manage
their uses so as not to interfere with its neighbors. This is a real evolution in this poorly-
developed international law context. Nevertheless, this rule remains quite unprecise about
of what amounts are equitable. Besides, some treaties specify equal portions whereas
others provide a speciﬁc means of allocations. Moreover, countries such as Turkey or China
continue to advocate extreme and self-interest theories even if eﬀorts to codify international
law are made. In fact, only one-ﬁfth treaties deﬁne enforcement mechanism. Historically,
force or the threat of force have ensured that a water treaty will be followed as it was the
case with Egypt or Israel because of their respective power in terms of institutions and
military organizations. Today, the Helsinki Rules are not binding and the UN Watercourse
Convention are binding upon ratifying countries. This convention was to come into force
once ratiﬁed by 35 countries. However, it has languished in limbo, with only 16 so far signing
up1. Namely, Burundi, China and Turkey voting against it and refuse to sign it. Egypt and
Israel abstained from voting.
Even if signs of cooperation are more numerous than actual conﬂicts, the way to stable
peaceful cooperation is still fraught with pitfulls as long as countries expect more beneﬁts
by engaging in conﬂicts. Moreover, other push factors like the increasing global demand
does not make the task easier. By the way, the U.N Secretary-general Koﬁ Annan said, in
2001, ﬁerce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conﬂict and wars in
the future
2 The Theoretical approach
The setting of the model is described within the framework of Hirshleifer ([21], [22]). He
proposes an approach akin to rent-seeking and contest models but he introduces a trade-oﬀ
between productive and unproductive activities which generalizes previous models. Namely,
his study is based on four steps [7].
First of all, assume that two countries share a common water resource. Moreover, we
propose an inaugural picture where initial allocations are given exogenously, for instance
predeﬁned by a treaty, such that total water W is split in two parts : W = w1 +w2. Thus,
each country can allocate its endowment between two activities, i.e. a share yi is allocated to
produce consumption goods and a part hi is spent in guns production. Thus, the partition
equation is as follows :
wi = yi + hi (1)
Then, these quantities are used as a production factor. To keep the model as simple
as possible, we assume that water is the only input for both activities. On one hand, we
use a linear production function for consumption goods. On the other hand, contrary to
the literature converting directly water into guns, we choose a strictly concave production
function for the coercive activity. Thus, denoting respectively by Fi and gi the consumption
goods production function and the guns production function, we have :
Fi(yi) = µiyi (2)
gi(hi) = gi(hi) = (λihi)α with α ∈]0, 1] (3)
with i = 1; 2, µi > 0 and λi > 0 the productive capacity of both countries.
1Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Namibia, Norway, Portugal, Qatar,
South Africa, Sweden, Syria and Uzbekistan
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The resources allocated to productive activities will determine a total contestable output.
In eﬀect, this contestable output is deﬁned as the aggregate production of both countries :
2∑
i=1
Fi(yi) (4)
Thirdly, the outcome of the conﬂict is, its turn, determined through the contest-success
function. Hirshleifer [22] and Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas [14] provide the well-known form
where the ratio of inputs to ﬁghting is considered important for the captured portion :
pi(g1, g2) =
gi
g1 + g2
with gi ≡ gi(hi) (5)
This function deﬁnes the probability to win the conﬂict for country i. Symmetrically,
its probability to loose the conﬂict corresponds to the probability to win the conﬂict for
country 2, (1− pi(gi, gj)) = pj(g1, g2). Under this remark, this contest function has the
standard assumptions, i.e. ∂gipi > 0 and ∂gjpi < 0. Additionally, this ratio implies that
if one of the two opponents does not allocate any resource to guns production, then the
other's probability is equal to 1; pi(gi, 0) = pj(0, gj) = 1 and pi(0, gj) = pj(gi, 0) = 0. Under
the assumption that countries have full information, then both have an incitation to invest
in contesting technology if its rival does.
The last step of this setting consists of specifying the income distribution equation. Here,
we characterize two scenarios. On one side, we outline a peace scenario which is deﬁned as
the condition in which no resource is allocated to guns production, i.e. hi = 0 and therefore
wi = yi. This situation is held as we assume that there exists a prior treaty securing the
peace between both countries. Thus, the payoﬀ is deﬁned by the production function (2).
Since the function is linear, it is straightforward that each country will use all their available
water. Therefore, the payoﬀ functions depend on the initial allocation wi.
Pi(wi) = Fi(wi)
= µiwi with i = 1; 2 (6)
On the other side, the second scenario corresponds to the conﬂict where countries contest
the aggregate outcome. We consider the conﬂict as a winner-take-all mechanism. In other
words, the winner will appropriate all the outcome and the other will loose all its production.
Thus, the income is given by the following expected payoﬀ :
Ci(y1, y2, g1, g2) = pi(g1, g2)
[
2∑
i=1
Fi(yi)
]
(7)
Since it is explained in the previous section, allocation rules are often deﬁned in old
treaties without considering the interest of all riparian states. Moreover, these repartitions
do not take into account neither the population growth or the economic development of
states in the sense that treaties specify only ﬁxed portions as in examples 1. Thereby, this
kind of water assignment can be challenged by one of both countries. It was the case for
the 1959 Nil agreement signed only between Egypt and Sudan. In fact, this agreement
followed a ﬁrst one signed in 1929 between Egypt and Great Britain who represented its
colonies Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Both treaties shared the ﬂow between the
most downstream countries without consulting other riparian states. Thus, Ethiopia has
challenged their validity and has expressed its disagreement inasmuch as its contribution to
the Nile river rises up more than 80%. The threat became more serious such as in 1979
when the Egyptian President Sadate has aﬃrmed that the only factor that could spark oﬀ
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a conﬂict is water. Today, even if all riparian countries has engaged in the Nil Initiative
since 2001, the Nil basin is already a risky area and any such claims can be still settled due
to imperfect institutions of governance and the lack of enforcement.
Therefore, given the increasing trend towards competitive utilizations, it is credible that
countries deviate from the initial scenario peace in order to increase their withdrawals that
will incite its neighbor to contest the resource and to expend some resources to produce
guns.
3 Towards Water Conﬂicts
The previous model allows us to analysis under which conditions a water-based conﬂict could
spark oﬀ. In order to achieve this objective, we need to rewrite the payoﬀ (7) by computing
with equations (2), (3) and (5). Thus, we obtain a function depending only on the quantity
of weapons :
Ci(g1, g2) =
gi
g1 + g2
[
µ1
(
W − w2 − g
β
1
λ1
)
+ µ2
(
w2 − g
β
2
λ2
)]
=
gi
g1 + g2
[
µ1W + w2(µ2 − µ1)− (b1gβ1 + b2gβ2 )
]
(8)
with β = 1α and bi =
µi
λi
.
This setting allows us to study the water allocation of both countries and, beyond, to
determine conditions to maintain a peace stability. We approach the water-based conﬂict as
a two-stage game. Actually, in a ﬁrst step, each country decides to enter the contest or not.
Based on its choice, it acts accordingly in stage 2 and optimally allocates its resource between
both productions. This structure allows us to solve the game by backward induction, i.e. to
solve the problem in stage 2 and with this knowledge go back to stage 1.
3.1 The second stage
Given the initial endowment, adversaries make decisions on guns gi and implicitly on their
water allocation between both productions. They choose simultaneously and non coopera-
tively their optimal amount of weapons. Thus, each country maximizes its payoﬀ (8) with
respect to the constraint wi − g
β
i
λi
≥ 0.
Before going further, let us remark the two following points :
• there is no interest in studying the case where both countries decide to bind their
constraint, wi =
gβi
λi
, because it means that they do not produce any consumption
good and the payoﬀ (8) will be zero.
• it is obvious that the case where only one country decides to invest all its resources
in arming leads to an asymmetric probability-to-win which is a quite ambiguous case.
Moreover, this discussion is not relevant for our further objective, i.e. the discussion
of the existence of a negotiation interval. Actually, we are going to observe that this
interval belongs to the interval deﬁned by the interior solution.
Lemma 1 Under the assumption that there is not comparative advantage, i.e. b1 = b2,
both countries produce the same quantities of guns :
g∗1 = g
∗
2 = g
∗ =
(
µ1W + w2(µ2 − µ1)
2b(1 + β)
)α
(9)
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which implies that each opponent has an equal probability to win the conﬂict, p∗i (g1, g2) =
1
2 .
The optimal conﬂict payoﬀ is as follows :
Ci(g∗1 , g
∗
2) =
β
2(1 + β)
[µ1W + w2(µ2 − µ1)]
≡ C∗i (w2) i = 1, 2 (10)
Proof 1 Under the assumption b1 = b2 = b, we obtain :
{
∂C1(g1,g2)
∂g1
= g2[a− b(gβ1 + gβ2 )]− βbgβ1 (g1 + g2) = 0
∂C2(g1,g2)
∂g2
= g1[a− b(gβ1 + gβ2 )]− βbgβ2 (g1 + g2) = 0
⇒ g1 = g2
with a = µ1W + w2(µ2 − µ1).
The equilibrium2 is given by g∗1 = g
∗
2 = g
∗ =
(
a
2b(1+β)
) 1
β
=
(
a
2b(1+β)
)α
.
Consequently, the optimal conﬂict payoﬀ of each country is C∗i (w2), i = 1, 2 
Since we said previously, we concentrate only on the interior solution. However, we have
to deﬁne the interval where this result is valid. Thus, we obtain that
W − w2 − g
β
1
λ1
> 0 ⇒ w2 < Wµ1(1 + 2β)
µ1(1 + 2β) + µ2
≡ B
w2 − g
β
2
λ2
> 0 ⇒ w2 > Wµ1
µ1 + µ2(1 + 2β)
≡ B
Therefore, over all the interval
[
B;B
]
, we know that both rivals have the same probability
to grab the consumption goods production as a whole.
3.2 The ﬁrst stage
Pursuing their self-interest, countries will compare their payoﬀ in both scenarios and choose
the best scenario. In fact, the choice is hardly dependent on the initial allocation between
both countries.
Thus, it is ﬁrst straightforward that the peace payoﬀ of country 1 is decreasing with w2
since, from equation (1) and (6), P1(w2) = µ1(W − w2) whereas the payoﬀ of country 2 is
increasing with w2 because of P2(w2) = µ2w2.
Concerning the conﬂict payoﬀ, we can observe that results are ambiguous. We have to
distinguish two cases because the derivative is as following (see lemma 1) :
∂C∗i (w2)
∂w2
=
β
2(1 + β)
(µ2 − µ1) (11)
The sign of this derivative depends on the level of technology used by the states to
produce their consumption goods. If country 2 has a better productive capacity then the
payoﬀ rises up with w2. However, if country 1 has a better productive capacity then the
payoﬀ decreases with w2. Obviously, if the amount of the water allocated to country 2 is
more important whereas country 1 is more productive, the expected gain in conﬂict becomes
smaller because the aggregate production becomes smaller.
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Figure 1: Comparative Statics for country 1
Figure 1 illustrates the situation in both cases for country 1. It is evident that there is an
allocation where country 1 will have a better well-being in the peace scenario, respectively
in the conﬂict scenario.
From Figure 1, we observe that over an interval w2 ∈ [0, w2[, country 1 prefers the peace
scenario. The upper-bound is deﬁned by :
P1(w2) > C∗1 (w2)
⇔ w2 ≡ (2 + β)µ1W(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2 > w2 (12)
Obviously, an increasing quantity w2 prevents country 1 from producing as it could expect
that leads to a higher payoﬀ in the conﬂict scenario.
For country 2, we can also observe that there is an allocation where country 2 will have a
better well-being in the peace scenario, respectively in the conﬂict scenario.
Figure 2: Comparative Statics for country 2
Figure 2 outlines that over an interval w2 ∈ [w2,W [, country 2 prefers the peace scenario.
The lower bound is deﬁned by :
P2(w2) > C∗2 (w2)
⇔ w2 > βµ1W
βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2
≡ w2 (13)
Given these results, if we compute both interval where countries prefer the peace sit-
uation, we obtain a negotiation interval. Within this area, both countries have interest
to allocate the adequate amount of water to insure peace and avoid wasting resources in
coercive activities.
2The second order conditions are satisﬁed : −bβgβ−1i [gjβ(gi + gj)]− βbgβi
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Proposition 1 ∀ w2 ∈ [w2;w2], there exists an allocation w2 where both countries are
better-oﬀ in the peace scenario.
Proof 2
w2 > w2
⇔ (2 + β)µ1W
(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2
>
βµ1W
βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2
⇔ β + 1 > 0
Therefore, we can conclude that [0;w2]
⋂
[w2;W ] = [w2;w2]. 
This proposition highlights a relevant result regarding the opportunity to achieve a peace
scenario. Actually, there exists a water allocation between both countries that allows to reach
a higher well-being when the peace scenario prevails. This interval can be interpreted as a
conﬂict indicator in the sense that the more this interval is greater, the less a conﬂict may
spark oﬀ. This deduction can have strong implications for an international sharing treaty.
Before going further, we verify that this interval is included in the interval of the interior
solution
[
B;B
]
.
w2 ≥ B ⇔ 2µ2(β + 1)(β − 1) ≥ 0
w2 ≤ B ⇔ 2µ2(β + 1)(β − 1) ≥ 0 because β ∈ [1,+∞[
Therefore [w2;w2] j
[
B;B
]
.
3.3 Study of the size of the negotiation interval
Until now, we have proved that there exists a negotiation interval in which both countries
can carry out the peace situation. This interval is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between both
switch points : w2 and w2.
D =
4µ1µ2W (1 + β)
[βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2] [(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2]
(14)
As we can observe, the size of this interval depends on the crucial components which are
the total quantity of water in the river W and the two productive capacities µi. In other
words, it will vary when these factors will impact the probability of conﬂict.
Proposition 2 The size of the negotiation interval is reduced by (i) an increasing water
scarcity and (ii) an increasing heterogeneity between both countries.
Proof 3 (i) It is straightforward that the sign of the derivative (15) is positive.
∂WD =
4µ1µ2(1 + β)
[βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2] [(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2]
(15)
(ii) The derivatives of 14 with respect to the productive parameters are
∂µ1D =
4µ2βW (1 + β)(2 + β)β(µ22 − µ21)
[βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2]
2 [(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2]
2 (16)
∂µ2D =
4µ1Wβ(1 + β)(2 + β)β(µ21 − µ22)
[βµ1 + (2 + β)µ2]
2 [(2 + β)µ1 + βµ2]
2 (17)
• If µ1 > µ2 then the derivative (16) is negative whereas the derivative (17) is positive.
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• If µ2 > µ1 then the derivative (16) is positive whereas the derivative (17) is negative.

Thus, this proposition highlights that an increasing water scarcity contributes to lower
the cooperative possibility as well as the heterogeneity of countries. Actually, the scarcity of
the resource stirs up tensions between riparian nations by reducing the size of the negotiation
interval until this interval disappears which is synonymous of the outbreak of war. In
addition, the heterogeneity of countries has the same impact on the size of the interval
that challenges one argument of Wolf [37] claiming that it is strategically impossible that
such events appear because of this heterogeneity. In fact, in an upstream/downstream
scenario, Wolf outlines that the only possibility could appear when the aggressor is both the
downstream state and the regional hegemon because the upper-state has no reason to launch
an attack and is not incited to build a project which will decrease either quantity or quality
to not annoy a stronger neighbor. By assuming that country 2 is the downstream country,
this result is embedded in proposition 3. However, we demonstrate that tensions are also
driven by the hegemony of country 1. When country 1 is more productive than country 2, an
increasing in its productive ability leads to decrease the size of the negotiation interval. In
fact, there are some observational evidences that support this result. Indeed, China decides
unilaterally to build its dam on the upper reaches of the Mekong which is regulated only in
its lower part by an agreement concluded between Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.
China follows an uncoordinated development of project that aﬀects the ﬂow of the Mekong
where most of the riparian states live from ﬁshing and agriculture. In line with this example,
Turkey has engaged in its Anatolia Projet, GAP, since 1977 which comprises about 20 dam
projects with hydro-power plants. Both examples denote the economic incentive for the
upper-state to derive water. Although China and Turkey are military and economically
stronger than the other riparian countries, they stir up potential quarrels.
4 The Nash-Bargaining solution
The previous results insure that there exists an opportunity to achieve the peace. Moreover,
it is economically more rationale to cooperate and share the surplus. Thus, it is interesting
to analyze the cooperative solution within a Nash-bargaining framework like Ansink and
Weikard [1]. Hence, we can analyze the possibility to prevent the contest where the contest
payoﬀ serves as the disagreement point.
Thus, if both countries agree that negotiations will be eﬀectively conducted, the purpose
consists of choosing the optimal allocation by determining the optimal w2 in the negotiation
interval [w2;w2].
To reach this objective, we assume here an easier production function for more con-
venience. Set α = 12 in equation (3) which implies that β = 2. Thus, the maximization
programm can be written as following :
max
w2
1
3
(2µ1(W − w2)− µ2w2)γ (2µ2w2 − µ1(W − w2))1−γ
w.r.t w2 ∈]w2;w2[ (18)
The optimal solution is therefore :
w∗2 = µ1W
(2µ1 + µ2(4− 3γ))
(2µ1 + µ2)(µ1 + 2µ2)
(19)
This quantity depends also on the three previous relevant determinants, i.e. W and µi
(i = 1, 2) but also on the power of negotiation of country 1, i.e. γ. All these parameters will
inﬂuence the quantity that would be allocated to country 2 in various ways.
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Proposition 3 The optimal bargaining allocation w∗2 is (i) decreasing with the bargaining
power of country 1 γ, (ii) increasing with the total water amount W , (iii) increasing with
the productivity of country 1 µ1 and (iv) decreasing with the productivity of country µ2.
Proof 4 The derivatives of the solution (19) with respect to the diﬀerent arguments are
∂Ww
∗
2 =
µ1 (2µ1 + µ2(4− 3γ))
(2µ1 + µ2)(µ1 + 2µ2)
(20)
∂γw
∗
2 = −
3γµ1µ2W
(2µ1 + µ2)(µ1 + 2µ2)
(21)
∂µ1w
∗
2 =
2µ21µ2W (1 + 3γ) + 8µ1µ
2
2W + 2µ
3
2(4− 3γ)
(2µ1 + µ2)2(µ1 + 2µ2)2
(22)
∂µ2w
∗
2 = −2µ1W
[µ21(14− 3γ) + 8µ1µ2]
(2µ1 + µ2)2(µ1 + 2µ2)2
(23)
It is straightforward that
• the sign of the derivative (20) is positive.
• the sign of the derivative (21) is negative.
• the sign of the derivative (22) is positive since 4− 3γ > 0.
• the sign of the derivative (23) is negative since 14− 3γ > 0. 
This proposition outlines some intuitive results. First, it is obvious that an increase of
the total quantity of water in the river leads to increase the share allocated to country 2.
Then, this amount will be lower with a stronger bargaining power of country 1. Eﬀectively,
the inﬂuence of both countries in a negotiation depends highly on their respective power.
This inﬂuence can stem from a stronger militarized force or a stronger commercial power.
In eﬀect, a country can threaten to buy some goods in another country. This kind of
threat is obvious credible if both countries have strong commercial relationships. Finally,
the heterogeneity between both countries plays a role : when country 1 is more productive,
the allocated amount of water to country 2 will be higher. This result captures the idea that
it needs more resources to produce their goods. However, one can wonder whether it could
be better to produce in the most productive state and then prefer exchanging. This could
be more eﬃcient to delocalize the production of water-intensive goods and concentrate the
eﬀorts in other production.
To conclude, this analysis shows that there exists an optimal allocation when an interval
of negotiation exists. This bargaining game allows countries to deﬁne property rights over
water and can be used to achieve an agreement. Some examples support this idea. For
instance, Thailand helped fund a hydroelectric project in Laos in exchange for a proportion
of the power to be generated.
5 Empirical Analysis
This section aims at testing our theoretical results described in proposition 3 through a
standard empirical approach. Namely, in this section, we assimilate negotiation as the
contrary of conﬂict. Therefore, an increase in the size the negotiation interval means a
decline in the probability of conﬂict. Thus, we want to analyze if a growing water scarcity
enhances the probability of a conﬂict between two countries sharing a river basin. From the
analysis of Gleditsch and al. [15], we know that there is a higher risk of military disputes
between countries sharing rivers. This variable performs a similar role as a contiguity dummy
and intuitively increases the probability. However, it does not give any information on the
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eﬀect of water quantities on military conﬂict. Thus, one can wonder whether the water
endowments inﬂuence interstate disputes within a river basin. Therefore, we perform a
regression analysis to investigate the actual relationship between the probability of interstate
outbreak and water scarcity.
Since the seminal work of Bremer [5], the dyadic analysis has become the analytical
cornerstone of interstate conﬂict studies. More precisely, the common way consists of using
undirected dyadic analysis where interactions ij or ji are not distinguished because the
empirical question is not to identify the aggressor and the victim but the existence of a
conﬂict within a dyad. Consequently, the dyads ij and ji are identical and only one of them
is kept to avoid double counting. Moreover, this approach allows us to take into account
variations in both the individual and the dyadic level that allows comparisons between pairs.
Some pairs may share many international rivers but each dyad is considered as a diﬀerent
observation because the interaction between both countries can vary from one basin to
another according to the area of the basin located in countries.
To achieve this analyze, we may distinguish various scenarios.
H1 : The greater the amount of water resources two countries share, the smaller the proba-
bility of dyadic conﬂict.
H2 : Pairs of countries that share many basins experience less conﬂict between them.
These two hypothesis are based on the ﬁrst result outlined in proposition 3. In other words,
we aim at testing the eﬀect of scarcity on the probability of a dyadic conﬂict. The scarcity
of water is either captured directly by the available quantities or approximated by a dummy
variable scored 1 whether the dyad shares many basins.
These hypothesis can be related to the fundamental economical problem which is that
individuals require even more resources to fulﬁll their needs. In eﬀect, as long as water re-
sources can fulﬁll these needs, we can expect that the probability of conﬂict is low. However,
as its was explained previously, the growing human requirements increase the competition
for this resource which is ﬁnite. Therefore, the amount of water that is shared by a pair of
countries reduces and an interstate conﬂict may spark oﬀ.
H3 : The unequal water repartition is positively correlated with the probability of a dyadic
conﬂict
This hypothesis captures the water endowment heterogeneity and outlines the idea illustrat-
ing in ﬁgures 1 and 2 where a country with few resources prefers engaging in conﬂict. Thus,
the unequal allocation would be an incitation to enter conﬂict.
5.1 Data
The database contains information on all pairs of countries between 1950 and 2002 that gives
22,819 observations. It consists of a collection of various variables assembled from diﬀerent
databases either related to international basins or individual countries. To measure conﬂict,
we take our dependant variable from the database developed by the PRIO staﬀ3. They
have coded the onset militarized interstate disputes with a minimum of one fatality from
the Correlates of War project. This limitation to fatal disputes allows us to minimize the
potential bias inherent in data on low-level conﬂict [13].
Then, the explanatory variables are presented in more details in table 3.
[Table 3]
In order to accurately test our theoretical model, we include some control variables.
They highlight how water-related variables impact the probability of conﬂict independently
of generally accepted explanations on the causes of conﬂict.
3International Peace Research Institute Oslo
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First, we introduce dummy variables representing political make-up of the dyad as com-
pared to a reference dyad of two democracies. Those variables come from the PRIO database
and are taken from the Polity IV scale of democracy and autocracy. Actually, the political
regime is a crucial factor driving interstate conﬂicts. On this basis, a dyad with uncon-
solidated regimes have a greater propensity for conﬂict. Thus, we have three dummies to
take into account dyads containing at least one consolidated regimes, dyads containing two
unconsolidated regimes and dyads containing two autocracies.
Then, as Gleditsch and al. [15], we consider a variable outlining the number of previous
years without a militarized dispute in the dyad. This variable may be a strong indicator of
peace.
Next, we form the dyad size variable, i.e. the log of the combined population of the
states that make up a dyad. This variable could be used as a proxy for a demand-measure.
Actually, dyad with large population should need greater amounts of resources and therefore
increase their withdrawals.
In order to test the heterogeneity of both countries, we perform a diﬀerential wealth
measure which is the ratio of the richer over the poorer country in terms of income per
capita (in log). This variable is used as a proxy to capture the development diﬀerence
between both countries composing the pair.
Finally, we insert some geographical measures such as the contiguity which is scored 1 if
the dyad shares a border and 0 otherwise, the distance between the capitals and the length
of their boundaries. This variable is based on the assumption that adjacency may enhance
the likelihood of conﬂict.
Concerning the water-based variables, the literature provides two approaches to test
the relationship between water and conﬂicts. First, we can use state-level data such as
the studies of Hensel, Mitchell and Sowers [20]. In this case, we use the standard scarcity
measure deﬁned by Falkenmark and Widstrand [12], that is the the per capita population
pressure on the freshwater supply. This variable comes from the FAO's information system
on water and agriculture : AQUASTAT. This is a ratio between the available freshwater
over the total population. From this variable, some dummies are created by confronting
the measure to available thresholds. For instance, shortages started to be considered when
a country reaches the point of water-stressed conditions below 1,700m3 per capita and per
year. Below 1,000m3 per capita and per year the resource is considered scarce and begin
to hamper human health and economic activities. To this end, we choose to score the dyad
to 1 if one of both countries is water-scarce and 0 otherwise. This variable will allow us
to test our hypothesis H1 by adding the total water available in the dyad and hypothesis
H2 by inserting scarcity thresholds. The second hypothesis can be investigated through the
variable that represents the percentage of the total basin area lying in the upstream state.
The second approach consists of using basin-level data such as Hensel and Brochman
[19]. These data include namely one supply-measure : water discharge and one demand-
measure such as the area of the basin located in the dyad in percent. This approach will also
allow to investigate the role of these variables on the likelihood of a conﬂict in a diﬀerent
way.
Finally, we add a dummy variable scored 1 if the pair of countries share more than one
basin and zero otherwise.
5.2 Model Speciﬁcation and Results
A multivariate logit model is proposed to analyze the relationship between international
rivers and military disputes taking into account some control variables.
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FMIDonsetij = α+ β1Onedemocratieij + β2Twoautoccratiesij + β3Unconsolidatedij
+ β4Peacehistoryij + β5Dyadsizeij + β6PowerGDPij
+ β7Contiguityij + β8LnDistij + β9LnLengthBound
+ β10LnDischargeij + β11OtherBasin+ β12Waterij + εij (24)
This equation allows us to test various models by replacing the variable waterij
by one of its equivalent deﬁning our diﬀerent scenarios. Some expectations for the
sign of parameters are yielded. First, in line with the study of Marshall and Jaggers,
a negative sign is expected for the three political regimes
(
β1 > 0; β2 > 0; β3 >
0
)
. Actually, these expectations are based on the well known hypothesis that a
liberal peace is achieved between two democratic regimes whereas the more important
propensity for conﬂict would be a dyad formed by two unconsolidated regimes. The
historical variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the conﬂict probability(
β4 < 0
)
. Then, according to our assumption that a large population can be a proxy
for capturing the pressure on the resource, the sign of the estimator of the dayd
size should be positive
(
β5 > 0
)
. Next, on the basis of our theoretical model,
the heterogeneity with respect to GDP per capita should contribute to increase the
probability of a dyadic conﬂict
(
β6 > 0
)
. Turning to the geographical variables, we
expect that they are positively correlated with the probability because geographical
proximity contributes to yield a positive increase in conﬂict probability
(
β7 > 0;
β8 < 0; β9 > 0
)
. Finally, concerning water-based variables, we expect to have a
negative sign with the discharge of the basin
(
β10 < 0
)
and a positive one with the
dummy related to the existence of other shared basins
(
β11 > 0
)
as well as for the
sign of the total water shared by the dyad
(
β12 > 0
)
.
Table 4 contains main empirical results for the conﬂict model.
[Table 4]
In a ﬁrst overview, we can observe that almost all standard variables have ex-
pected sign. Brieﬂy, the political regime are positively correlated with the probability
of conﬂict and highly signiﬁcant. Thus, political instabilities increase the likelihood of
conﬂicts. At the opposite, historical series of years of peace decrease the probability
to an outbreak. As usual, this is the most important factor driving peace. Turning
to the total population of the dyad, we can observe that this determinant increases
the probability and is highly signiﬁcant. Contrary to our intuitive, the likelihood of
interstate disputes is not impacted by the heterogeneity within the dyad in terms of
GDP. Finally, only the distance variable plays its role in inﬂuencing negatively the
likelihood of the conﬂict between both countries within the dyad. Globally, most of
these variables ﬁt with prior research.
A perusal observation of parameters related to water speciﬁc variables will allow
us to conﬁrm or not our theoretical results. Thus,Model I tests the discharge of the
basin but does not provide signiﬁcant results. This suggests that the total amount of
water in the basin does not inﬂuence the relationship between two countries. Thus,
this result suggests us to perform another variable that is the total quantity of water
shared by both countries instead of the basin discharge. Model II conﬁrms our
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theoretical intuition with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the total quantity of water
shared by the dyad. This result is sustained when we test the total water per capita
rather the total water. Table 5 presents the new estimation results.
[Table 5]
Therefore, this result supports our theoretical result where the total water shared
by two countries W is a crucial component impacting the size of the negotiation
interval. By extrapolation, it suggests that if we can consider all riparian nations
within the basin then the discharge would be a crucial determinant to analyze the
tension within a basin. Therefore, results in Model I can be lessened and would be
worth considering a more global framework.
Model III tests the situation when dyads share many basins and provides inter-
esting results. Actually, this variable is highly signiﬁcant and decreases the probabil-
ity of conﬂict. In fact, sharing many basins is synonymous of increasing the amount
of water. This result is therefore another way to prove that as long as there is lots
of resources, peace can be achieved.
However, Model IV and Model V do not provide expected results with both
non signiﬁcant estimations. Both variables, i.e. the presence of a water-scarce coun-
try and the area of the basin located in the upstream state are probably not appro-
priated to test the uneven distribution of water.
Nevertheless, as Gleditsch and al. [15] suggested, the analysis of regional impacts
can bring more insights in this issue. Thus, we propose to study the interaction of
these variables with the regional location, especially by taking into account if one or
more nations are in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) or in the MENA region. The latter
region remains one of the tensest area of the world and water resources are scarce
by nature. Table 6 gives results for both regions.
[Table 6]
We observe that both variables remain insigniﬁcant for nations in Sub-Saharan
Africa but, at the opposite, become signiﬁcant with expected signs for the MENA re-
gion. In other words, the interaction between a country facing with absolute scarcity
and a country located in the MENA regions increases the probability-to-conﬂict.
This region is still a potential area for conﬂict between countries and more advanced
research should be conducted to improve the understanding of the speciﬁc factors
driving conﬂicts. Concerning the area of the basin in the upstream state, the result
is also signiﬁcative. It conﬁrms that the uneven distribution is also a key deter-
minant but, only, in an arid region. Actually, the MENA region faces with high
water scarcity. Thus, this disparity can reinforce the likelihood of conﬂicts because
countries are more vulnerable.
With respect to these models, we can conclude that globally the malthusian
scenario is supported by our empirical analysis. First, we outline the total amount
shared by a dyad is an important driving force. On this basis, one can deduce
results for river basins containing several countries. The more are there are countries,
the more the probability-to-conﬂict should increase. Second, more regional analysis
allows us to aﬃne results to observe that disparities in water endowments may be
also a key determinant.
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6 Conclusion
Talks of water-based conﬂicts disseminate around the globe these years. A recent
report of the U.S. National Intelligence Council concludes that the likelihood of in-
terstate outbreak will increase during the next 15 years as countries press against
the limits of available water. Nonetheless, some dismiss these warnings as alarmist.
A lot of arguments are advanced to support one side or the other. However, the
theoretical literature is still rare. This analysis contributes in the reduction in this
gap.
In fact, the contribution is two-fold. First, the study explores the relationship be-
tween water and conﬂict into a game-theoretical framework. This approach is based
on the conﬂict model outlining a trade-oﬀ between production and appropriation.
This model allows us to take into account the opportunity cost when an economic
agent engages in contest. By comparing this scenario with a benchmark case where
both countries use all their resources for production, we obtain an interesting result.
Indeed, cooperation is a possible outcome only if there is enough water and countries
are quite similar. According to these factors, arid and semi-arid areas are therefore
the most potential water-related disputes. UN ﬁgures suggest there are around 300
potential conﬂicts over water. For instance, the Central Asia is a high risk area where
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan meet tensions over the Amu
Daria and Syr Daria rivers. By 2015, nearly 40% of the estimated world population
will live in countries that ﬁnd diﬃculties to meet their demand. Therefore, the in-
creasing competition for this natural resource seems to be convincing.
The second step consisted of testing this primary results using an empirical analysis.
This study is build in line with empirical studies. The econometric analysis con-
ﬁrms that the water scarcity is an important determinant in water-based interstate
conﬂicts contrary to the heterogeneity of countries. On the basis of this result, the
question of to what degree water scarcity is likely to aﬀect interstate relations can be
raised. Even if there exists some scarcity measures but the answer is still ambiguous.
Given these results, a lot of policy implications can be drawn. Indeed, we can
wonder what governments and international agents can do to prevent the eruption
of violence and political instability. A ﬁrst implication is related to the renegotiation
of existing treaties. Since we discussed previously, most of them are not well-deﬁned
anymore and do not take into account all the co-riparian states. Eﬀorts have already
been done such as the creation of the Nile Initiative Basin in 2001. However, in other
international basins, it is more diﬃcult because some political entities are not repre-
sented such as the Palestinians along the Jordan or the Kurds along the Euphrates.
Second, eﬀorts can be done at the internal level to increase the productivity of water
use, namely in irrigation techniques. This seems to be a good pattern to reduce water
pressure. Today, several solutions can be thought such as recycling or reusing waste
water, desalination or rainwater harvesting. Finally, a more conventional solution is
also suitable. Stronger policies have to be drawn to regulate water use in order to
encourage thriftiness otherwise freshwater suﬀers from the tragedy of commons.
To conclude this study, water may be an important source of future conﬂicts.
However, public policymakers can mitigate this risk by implementing policies which
target the relevant determinants.
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Appendix 2 : Deﬁnition and Descriptive statistics
Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Database Mean Std. Dev. N
FMIdonset 0.072 PRIO 0.258 22819
onedemoc PRIO 0.236 0.425 22819
twoautoc PRIO 0.242 0.428 22819
unconsolidated PRIO 0.34 0.474 22819
peacehistory PRIO -0.178 0.334 22256
dyadsize 10.717 1.468 22256
contiguity 0.701 0.458 22819
lndistance PRIO 6.363 0.86 22819
lnboundary PRIO 4.623 3.144 22819
PowerGdp 2.382created 3.642 21197
LnDischarge AQUASTAT12 376.079 1127.342 20111
shareotherbasin created 2.666 46.139 20609
TotalWaterShare created 6.326 1.641 20559
DyadOneScare created 0.888 0.315 22819
percupstream PRIO 0.192 0.202 22819
12FAO's information system on water and agriculture
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Table 5: Extension of Model II
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
onedemoc 1.59∗∗ (0.52)
twoautoc 1.63∗∗ (0.60)
unconsolidated 1.96∗∗ (0.55)
peacehistory -3.12∗∗ (0.21)
dyadsize 0.29∗∗ (0.10)
PowerGdp 0.00 (0.01)
contiguity -0.17 (0.49)
lndistance -0.53∗∗ (0.15)
lnboundary 0.03 (0.08)
TotalWaterCapShare -0.31∗∗ (0.09)
Intercept -6.89∗∗ (0.93)
N 18337
Log-likelihood -2355.76
χ2(10) 387.07
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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